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COVENANT OF WARRANTY
The covenant of warranty is one running with the land and operates as
a guarantee by the grantor that title is vested in him and will vest in the
grantee after conveyance. 371 The general warranty is usually phrased,
[A]nd I do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators
to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said premises unto the
said ,

his heirs and assigns, against every person whom-

soever, lawfully claiming or to claim the same, or any part thereof."7 '

To protect the grantee from failure of title the warranty imposes on the
covenantor the duty to defend the covenantee's title in a suit for title, pro-

viding that the covenantee gives full notice to the covenantor of the pending
suit and of the consequences of neglecting to defend.3 79 A further obligation
exists to indemnify the grantee for failure of title 80-a duty which is not contingent on the grantor's having notice of and defending the suit.3 81

Although the covenant of warranty is a simple indemnification for failure
of title, in Texas it is the broadest of the deed covenants, encompassing the
383
covenant of quiet enjoyment3 82 and the covenant against encumbrances.
The application of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, however, is limited when
construing the covenant of warranty since a mere cloud on the title does not
constitute a breach of warranty. 384 While mere possession by one other than

the grantee breaches the covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of the covenant

of warranty requires a failure of title.3 8 5 Thus, the incidents of the covenant
377. Forrest v. Hanson, 424 S.W.2d 899, 904 (Tex. 1968); White v. Frank, 91 Tex.
66, 70, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897); Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 366, 3 S.W. 444,
447 (1887); Phillips v. Woodard, 327 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1959, no writ).
378. 1 TEXAS FORMS-LEGAL AND BUSINESS § 2.32 (1969).
379. Clark v. Mumford, 62 Tex. 531, 533 (1884); Old Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bibbs,
184 S.W.2d 313, 316-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
380. Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. 1969); White v. Frank, 91 Tex. 66,

70, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897); Phillips v. Woodard, 327 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Texarkana 1959, no writ).
381. Clark v. Mumford, 62 Tex. 531, 533 (1884); Simpson v. Belvin, 37 Tex. 674,
685 (1873); Peck v. Hensley, 20 Tex. 673, 677-78 (1858); O'Connor v. Sanchez, 229
S.W. 309, 311-12 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted); McGregor v. Tabor, 26
S.W. 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).
382. Williams v. Turner, 50 Tex. 137, 142 (1878); Compton v. Trico Oil Co., 120
S.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938, writ ref'd); Shannon v. Childers, 202
S.W. 1030, 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1918, writ ref'd).
383. City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 56, 202 S.W.2d 449, 453 (1947); Fannin Inv. & Dev. Co. v. Neuhaus, 427 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1968, no writ); Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Chapman v. Parks, 347 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rives v. James, 3 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. Civ. App.
San Antonio 1928, writ dism'd).
384. Schell v. Black, 321 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, no writ);
Worthen v. Peoples Loan & Homestead Co., 150 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1941, no writ).
385. Jones' Heirs v. Paul's Heirs, 59 Tex. 41, 45-46 (1883); Schell v. Black, 321 S.W.
2d 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, no writ); Fitzgerald v. Compton, 67 S.W.
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of quiet enjoyment will be included in a warranty only when consistent with
386
the purpose of the warranty.
The covenant against encumbrances, on the other hand, does not concern
failure of title. It is intended to protect the grantee from the interests of
third parties, such as liens or easements, which diminish the value of the
estate conveyed. 3s7 'Because they are intended to protect against different
types of disabilities, covenants against encumbrances and covenants of warranty operate differently. 388 A covenant against encumbrances invokes the
liability of the grantor for damages based on the diminished value of the
estate,3 8 9 while a covenant of warranty operates as an indemnity for failure
of title. 390
Since a covenant of warranty protects actual title while a covenant against
encumbrances protects only use and value, the inclusion of a covenant against
encumbrances in a warranty is inconsistent with the purposes of the warranty.
Many Texas courts, however, have continued to treat covenants against encumbrances as included in warranties and have thus reached some unusual
results.8 91
Since the warranty is a guarantee, it has no effect on the validity of a conveyance; rather it is a separate agreement for indemnification if title should
fail.3 92 As a separate contract, the warranty expresses the grantor's confidence in the title conveyed, and therefore, cannot strengthen the title or enlarge the estate conveyed. 393 For example, if a quitclaim is conveyed with
131, 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, no writ); Stark v. Homuth, 45 S.W. 761, 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1898, writ dism'd).
386. Jones' Heirs v. Paul's Heirs, 59 Tex. 41 (1883); Schell v. Black, 321 S.W.2d
373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, no writ).
387. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. El Paso & N.E.R.R., 156 S.W. 561, 565 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1913, writ ref'd) (liens, easements and servitudes are encumbrances that are
consistent with the fee being in the grantor).
388. Id. at 565.
389. Pochyla v. Cralle, 42 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, no writ).
390. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. El Paso & N.E.R.R., 156 S.W. 561, 565 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1913, writ ref'd).
391. The courts seem to use warranty as a generic term. The most obvious example
of this treatment is in the City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 202 S.W.2d 449
(1947) where there was a public servitude on the property conveyed. Even though the
court recognized the differences between the two covenants, it concluded that the public
servitude was an encumbrance and therefore the title had partially failed. Id. at 5155, 202 S.W.2d at 453-55. Another example of the confusion is Eric Ericksson, Inc.
v. Crooks, 508 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ) where at the time
of the conveyance an easement for drainage existed. The court held that this easement
was a breach of warranty but damages were assessed in the amount of diminished value,
the proper calculation of damages for the covenant against encumbrances. id. at 118.
392. Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 300, 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1956); White v.
Frank, 91 Tex. 66, 70, 40 S.W. 962, 964 (1897); Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 366.
3 S.W. 444, 447 (1887); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Phillips v. Woodard, 327 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd).
393. Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 300, 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1956); Richardson
v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 366, 3 S.W. 444, 447 (1887); Phillips v. Woodard, 327 S.W.2d
622, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, no writ).
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a warranty, the protected interest will be the right, title and interest owned
by the grantor at the time of the conveyance.3 94 In addition, a warranty
cannot limit a grant, since indemnity applies only to the portions of the grant
395
warranted.
A covenant of warranty runs with the land, passing from one purchaser
to another through each successive link in the chain of title. 39 6 In Flaniken
v. Nea1397 a sheriff executed a quitclaim instrument in a foreclosure 'sale.
Since there was a warranty in the chain of title, the supreme court found
that the present grantee could recover against a previous grantor who had
warranted such title.3 98 A warranty is not necessary for the validity of a
conveyance; a deed without such a covenant will convey the grantor's entire
interest in the estate, including the covenant of warranty.3 99 The existence
of a covenant of warranty somewhere in the chain of title does not, however,
always mean that the warranty continues to exist for all subsequent grantees.
The covenant runs with the land only until it is broken. 40 0 At the time of
a breach the covenant becomes personal, and a subsequent conveyance, even
with a new warranty, will not operate to assign an action under the original
40
covenant. '
In addition to a general warranty, which is an indemnity for failure of title
in any situation, a grantor may limit the warranty to apply only to special
situations. The most common of the limited warranties utilizes the limiting
words "by, through or under me" and restricts the scope of the grantor's obligation to defend title against those specific claimants.4 0 2 Thus, a grantee
394. Roberts v. Corbett, 265 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, writ
ref'd).
395. Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. 1969). In Davis v. Andrews, 361
S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) a portion of the deed stated
"we do hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators to warrant and
defend . . . against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same
or any part thereof for a period of 20 years from date hereof and no longer." Id. at
421. The court concluded that since the limitation for years was found only in the warranty, its application was confined to the warranty and it was not intended to limit the
title conveyed to less than a fee simple. Id. at 425.
396. Flanniken v. Neal, 67 Tex. 629, 633, 4 S.W. 212, 214 (1887); Williams v.
Turner, 50 Tex. 137, 142 (1878); Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84, 86 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1922, jdgmt adopted); Fender v. Farr, 262 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shannon v. Childers, 202 S.W. 1030, 1031 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1918, writ ref'd).
397. 67 Tex. 629, 4 S.W. 212 (1887).
398. Id. at 634, 4 S.W. at 215.
399. Id. at 632, 4 S.W. at 214.
400. Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84, 86 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt
adopted); see Massad v. Bumpus, 146 S.W.2d 1073, 1075 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
401. Compton v. Trico Oil Co., 120 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938,
writ ref'd) (conveyance of fee after breach is not an assignment of the right of action
to the grantee); accord, Fudge v. Hogge, 323 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
402. The standard form for this limited warranty is:
And I hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors, and administrators to warrant and
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will have no claim against the grantor on such a limited warranty if there is
403
an adverse claimant.
,In
order for a limited warranty to displace a general one, the necessary
words of limitation must be clearly expressed. 40 4 'For instance, a warranty
will generally be effective from the date a deed is executed; thus, to create
a warranty which will become operative at a different time, the grantor must
specify the effective date. ,In
'Phillipsv. Woodard405 a warranted assignment
of a mineral estate was to be effective on the date of the first oil production.
The first production occurred prior to the execution of the assignment, at
which time the title was free of any adverse claims. The grantee alleged
that the warranty was to have operated from the date of the execution of
the assignment, while the grantor alleged that the warranty had applied only
from the effective date of the assignment. The civil appeals court concluded
that since the limitation was not clearly expressed, the warranty became applicable at the date of the execution of the assignment, the usual time of ap40 6
plication.
Limiting the warranty to exclude restrictions, covenants or conditions appears unnecessary since none of these exceptions is inconsistent with the title.
Designation of the covenant against encumbrances as part of the warranty,
however, has prompted the use of this type of limited warranty. Thus, the
covenantor who wants to restrict the covenant against encumbrances should
do so by a specific warranty provision.
EFFECT ON AFTER ACQUIRED TITLE

The covenant of warranty requires the grantor to defend title as well as
to indemnify for its failure. Consistent with this purpose, a grantor may not
act in derogation of the warranted title. 40 T Since the warranty is a covenant
forever defend all and singular the premises unto the said
-,
his heirs and
assigns, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same
or any part thereof, by, through or under me, but not otherwise.
4 R. STAYTON, TExAs FORMS § 2367 (1959) (emphasis added).
403. In McCracken v. Taylor, 146 S.W. 693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1912,
no writ), the grantor's wife had not been properly joined in her husband's conveyance
of their homestead. The deed contained a warranty limited to claims "under" the
grantor. When the wife subsequently brought suit and recovered the homestead, her
claim was not under the grantor, but in her own right; thus her claim did not constitute
a breach of the warranty. Accord, Garrett v. Houston Land & Trust Co., 33 S.W.2d
775, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1930, writ ref'd). See also Hein v. Henry, 299
S.W. 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, no writ).
404. James v. Adams & Wickes, 64 Tex. 193, 196 (1885).
405. 327 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd).
406. Id. at 625. A warranty, therefore, can be limited to apply to failure of title
that is within the chain of title [Owen v. Yocum, 341 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1960, no writ)], in time, [Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.)] or for any restrictions on title,
[Keith v. Seymour, 335 S.W.2d 862, 866, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (grantor warranted to defend the title "except as against reservations,
restrictions, covenants and conditions of record applicable to this property .... ")]
407. Fannin Inv. & Dev. Co. v. Neuhaus, 427 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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running with the land, the estoppel applied to the grantor extends to those
claiming under him, protecting both the subsequent grantee and those in
privity with him. 40 8 When there is a warranted conveyance by a grantor who
does not have title, but who acquires title after the conveyance is made, the
grantor is estopped to assert this after acquired title against his grantee or
his -privies: the grantor of a covenant of warranty may not himself cause
a breach of that covenant by asserting a claim inconsistent with. the estate
conveyed and protected by the warranty. 40 9
Not only is the grantor estopped to assert after acquired title, but the
grantor's title passes eo instanti to his grantee. 4 10 For example, when an heir
has conveyed an interest in an estate to which he subsequently acquires title
in the administrator's sale, his title passes to the grantee. 411 This applies
even when the grantor has not personally acquired title at the administrator's
sale. 412

In Robinson v. Douthit413 where a son conveyed title to his father's

estate and subsequently acquired title through another who had purchased
at the administrator's sale, the title passed through the son to his grantee. 41 4
A similar result occurs when a partial interest is owned, the total estate is
conveyed, and the entire interest is subsequently obtained. 415
After acquired title will pass to the grantee only in situations where the
title warranted is inconsistent with the subsequent claim of the grantee. In
Harn v. Smith 416 the grantor claimed the granted property by adverse 'possession. The court held that an after acquired title by adverse -possession does
Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ); Wade v. Brockmann, 404 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
408. Davis v. Agnew, 67 Tex. 206, 214, 2 S.W. 376, 378 (1886).
409. Clark v. Gauntt, 133 Tex. 558, 562, 161 S.W.2d 270, 271 (1942); Hale v. HolIon, 36 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), rev'd on other grounds, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W.
287 (1897). See generally Hemingway, After-Acquired Title in Texas, 20 Sw. L.J. 97
(1963).
In Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Witherspoon, 126 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1939, no writ) the court held that if the grantor did not possess the estate
which the deed purports to convey but the intention to convey a fee simple is shown
by the deed, the grantor and his privies are estopped to claim by an after acquired title
even though the deed contains no warranty.
410. Baldwin v. Root, 90 Tex. 546, 553, 40 S.W. 3, 6 (1897); Galloway v. Moeser,
82 S.W.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, no writ).
411. Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101 (1885); Ackerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211
(1873); Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 338 (1869); Land Title, Bank & Trust Co. v. Witherspoon,126 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ).
412. Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101, 106 (1885).
413. Id. at 101.
414. Id. at 105. See generally 27 TExAs L. REv. 856 (1949).
415. Galloway v. Moeser, 82 S.W.2d 1067 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, no
writ); Carnes v. Swift, 56 S.W. 85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
In Galloway v. Moeser, 82 S.W.2d 1067 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, no writ)
a mortgage with a general warranty was executed on partnership property by only one
partner. The court held that when the partner later acquired the remainder of the interest, that interest also passed to the mortgagee. Id. at 1068; accord, Roberts v. Corbett, 265 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, writ ref'd). But see Clark
v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942).
416. 79 Tex. 310, 15 S.W. 240 (1891).
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not pass to the grantee; 4 17 thus, an adverse title acquired by the grantor during the grantee's right of possession under the deed is not a breach of warranty. 41" The covenant cannot be extended to cover future laches of the
vendee by which he loses the title conveyed to him. 41 9 Likewise, it guarantees title only at the time of the conveyance. Thus if a grantor regains title
from the grantee through a tax sale, for example, the tax title does not then
pass to the grantee. 420 Consistent with this reasoning, a grantor who transfers by a quitclaim instrument may assert an after acquired title against the
grantee. 421 The quitclaim purports to convey only the right, title or interest
of the grantor at the time of the conveyance; therefore, if a grantor of a quitclaim subsequently acquires title to the estate, this new title does not conflict
with the estate previously conveyed. In addition, an after acquired title will
4 22
not pass to the grantee if no consideration was given for the warranty.
Thus, an evaluation of the purpose of the warranty offers the best test in
determining the circumstances in which an after acquired title automatically
passes to the grantee. If the claim is in derogation of the title granted, then
the subsequently acquired title will pass to the grantee. If not, the grantor
may assert his claim.
BREACH OF WARRANTY

Both complete and partial failure of title constitute breaches of warranty. 423 Title does not fail because there is -a cloud on the title, 424 or because the estate is in the possession of a trespasser, 425 since neither of these
situations interferes with the existence of title in the grantee.
To constitute a breach of warranty, there must first be an outstanding paramount title 42 -one which is superior to the grantee's and which existed at
417. Id. at 314, 15 S.W. at 242.
418. Hein v. Henry, 299 S.W. 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, no writ).
419. Ham v. Smith, 79 Tex. 310, 314, 15 S.W. 240, 242 (1891); accord, Daniel v.
Jones, 450 S.W.2d 928, 932-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see
Sabine Valley Timber & Lumber Co. v. Cagle, 149 S.W. 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1912), rev'd, 109 Tex. 178, 202 S.W. 942 (1918).
420. Foster v. Johnson, 89 Tex. 640, 36 S.W. 67 (1896).
421. Roberts v. Corbett, 265 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, writ
ref'd); cf. Burns v. Goodrich, 392 S.W.2d 689, 692-93 (Tex. 1965).
422. Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 559, 32 S.W. 520, 522 (1895); Ackerman v.
Smiley, 37 Tex. 211, 217 (1872).
423. See for example, Jones' Heirs v. Paul's Heirs, 59 Tex. 41 (1883); Schell v.
Black, 321 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, no writ); Fitzgerald v.
Compton, 67 S.W. 131, 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, no writ); Stark v. Homuth, 45 S.W.
761, 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ dism'd).
424. Norton v. Schmucker, 83 Tex. 212, 214, 18 S.W. 720, 721 (1892); Schell v.
Black, 321 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959, no writ); Simonton v.
Taylor, 306 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ).
425. Norton v. Schmucker, 83 Tex. 212, 214, 18 S.W. 720, 721 (1892); Biggs v.
Doak, 259 S.W. 665, 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1924, no writ).
426. Flanagan v. Ward, 12 Tex. 209 (1854); Worthen v. Peoples Loan & Homestead
Co., 150 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, no writ); Felts v. Whitaker,
129 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939), afl'd, 137 Tex. 578, 155
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the time of the conveyance. 42 7 The second requisite for a breach of warranty
is that there must also be an eviction. 428 The definition of eviction has sometimes been limited in scope to apply only when the grantee has been ousted
by a court judgment. 4 29 The supreme court has found this strict rule to be
unjust because it delays proceedings against the grantor and increases the
430
amount of damages by adding the cost of defending an additional lawsuit.
Accordingly, the rule has been relaxed in cases where the grantee attempts
to take possession and finds another claiming under superior title. If the
claimant refuses to give up possession, threatening enforcement of his rights,
the grantee is considered evicted. 431 The rule has been liberalized even further by adoption of the standard of "eviction in legal contemplation. ' 43 2 This
type of eviction occurs regardless of possession, when the facts reveal that
it would be useless for the grantee to attempt to maintain the title conveyed;
therefore, when the grantee yields to a force he cannot resist, he is, in contemplation of law, evicted. 433 Examples of this type of eviction include
where a claimant has superior title, has possession by superior title, or threat43 4
ens with superior title.
Eviction also occurs when a claimant obtains superior title by judgment
in a trespass to try title suit. 43 5 But since the grantor under a covenant of
warranty has the duty, when notified, to defend his grantee's title, such a
judgment alone is not sufficient to establish a breach of warranty if the
grantor was not a party to the suit to try title. 436 In that situation the judgment is evidence only of eviction. Independent evidence that the claimant's
title is superior to the warrantee's is necessary in order to prevent collusion
S.W.2d 604 (1941); Dupree v. Savage, 154 S.W. 701, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1913, writ ref'd).
427. See Westrope v. Chamber's Estate, 51 Tex. 178, 187 (1879); Love v. Minerva
Petroleum Corp., 105 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ).
428. Rancho Bonito Land & Livestock Co. v. North, 92 Tex. 72, 75-76, 45 S.W.994,
996 (1898); Cross v. Thomas, 264 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953,
writ refd n.r.e.); Love v. Minerva Petroleum Corp., 105 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ); Dupree v. Savage, 154 S.W. 701, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1913, writ ref'd); ci. Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d
154, 156 (Tex. 1973).
429. Westrope v. Chamber's Estate, 51 Tex. 178, 187 (1879).
430. Id. at 187; accord, Schneider v. Lipscombe County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 146
Tex. 66, 71, 202 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1947).
431. Felts v. Whitaker, 129 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939),
aff'd, 137 Tex. 578, 155 S.W.2d 604 (1941).
432. Id. at 685.
433. Id. at 685. Schneider v.Lipscombe County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 146 Tex.
66, 71, 202 S.W.2d 832, 835 (1947) promulgated the two elements of a constructive
eviction-( 1) a positive assertion of a paramount title and (2)yielding to that assertion.
434. Felts v. Whitaker, 129 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939),
aff'd, 137 Tex. 578, 155 S.W.2d 604 (1941).
435. Simpson v.Belvin, 37 Tex. 674, 685 (1873).
436. Johns v. Hardin, 81 Tex. 37, 16 S.W. 623 (1891); Peck v. Hensley, 20 Tex.
673 (1858); McGregor v.Tabor, 26 S.W. 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ). See
generally TEx. R. Ctv. P. 39.
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between the claimant and the warrantee. 4 3 7 Thus, the most efficient practice
is to join the warrantor in any suit for title between the claimant and the
warrantee, making the judgment binding on all the parties and establishing
438
itas conclusive proof of superior title.
Eviction may also be effected when the claimant merely threatens by superior title. When paramount title is positively asserted against a warrantee,
he 'is not required to make futile resistance to a manifestly superior claim. 43 9
By surrendering the estate under this option, however, the warrantee assumes
the burden of proving, in a subsequent suit against his warrantor, the superiority of the title to which he has yielded. 4 40 In Felts v. Whitaker441 the
grantor, purporting to convey land to one grantee by a general warranty deed,
had previously conveyed an unrecorded deed to another grantee. 442 Since
the previous deed was not of record, it was actually inferior to that taken
by the subsequent grantee: the strength of the
deed, to which the
grantee yielded, was dependent on the claimant's previous
securing title by limitations.
Since 'the grantee had: 'to prove that the title to which he yielded was superior,
he was unable to establish a breach of the warranty. 443 A grantee may be
convinced there is an outstanding title, but this belief must be supported by
444
the evidence.
Eviction also occurs when at the time of the conveyance the grantee finds
the premises, in possession of another claiming under paramount title. 445 In
order to establish eviction and a breach of warranty in this situation, the warrantee is not required either to attempt to take possession or to bring suit
for title against the claimant. 446 But, since the warrantor is not bound to
437. Peck v. Hensley, 20 Tex. 673, 678 (1858); McGregor v. Tabor, 26 S.W. 443,
444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ); Maverick v. Routh, 26 S.W. 1008, 1009 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1894, writ ref'd).
438. The warrantee has to join his warrantor in a suit for title to establish conclusive
proof of superior title. McGregor v. Tabor, 26 S.W. 443, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894,
no writ).
439. Schneider v. Lipscombe County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 146 Tex. 66, 71, 202
S.W.2d 832, 835 (1947); Felts v. Whitaker, 129 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1939), aff'd, 137 Tex. 578, 155 S.W.2d 604 (1941); Love v. Minerva Petroleum
Corp., 105 S.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, no writ); Larkin v.
Trammel, 105 S.W. 552, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
440. Schneider v. Lipscombe County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 146 Tex. 66, 71, 202
S.W.2d 832, 835 (1947); Westrope v. Chamber's Estate, 51 Tex. 178, 188 (1879); Simonton v. Taylor, 306 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ).
441. 129 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939), affd, 137 Tex. 578, 155
S.W.2d 604 (1941).
442. Id. at 685.
443. Id at 686.
444. Cross v. Thomas, 264 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). But see Shannon v. Childers, 202 S.W. 1030, 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.-E
Paso 1918, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
: 445. Jones' Heirs v. Paul's Heirs, 59 Tex. 41, 45-46 (1883); accord, Compton v.
Trico Oil Co., 120 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1938, writ ref'd).
446. Jones' Heirs v. Paul's Heirs, 59 Tex. 41, 46 (1883); Simonton v. Taylor, 306
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protect against the assertions of trespassers, the warrantee, in a suit on the
447
covenant, must prove that the claimant in possession has the superior title.
A grantee cannot evict himself. If a grantee purchases a title when he
already possesses a title superior to that conveyed to him by his grantor, it
would be extending the eviction concept beyond reason to designate this as
a breach of warranty. 448 To allow the warrantee to proceed against his warrantor would be contrary to the concept that the warrantee may not vo01untar449
ily yield to the claimant: the grantee cannot be forced to yield to himself.
In addition, a warrantee may not invite an assertion of superior title. 4 50 A
451
trespass to try title suit, however, will not be considered such' an invitation.
To establish a breach of warranty, then, a grantee must prove (1) that
there has been a positive assertion of a paramount title, and (2) that he has
been forced to yield to that assertion. 45 2 There are decisions, however, which
45 3
have not considered these elements when evaluating a breach of warranty.
In City of Beaumont v. Moore45 4 the supreme court found a breach of warranty in a case where there Was a servitude on the estate but no hostile claim
455
of title.
Since Moore did not involve an assertion of superior title, it appears that a
breach of the covenant against encumbrances was used as the vehicle by
which to find a breach of warranty. The purpose of the warranty is not
served by allowing a claim of anything less than superior title to constitute
a breach. The only purpose of.a warranty is to protect title; thus a finding
of breach of the warranty should reflect this purpose by requiring both an
assertion of paramount title and an eviction or an operational eviction by
yielding to the assertion.
Once there is a breach of warranty, the covenant no longer runs with the
S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, no writ); Larkin v. Trammel, 105
S.W. 552, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).

447. Worthen v. People's Loan & Homestead Co., 150 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1941, no writ); Felts v. Whitaker, 129 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1939), aff'd, 137 Tex. 578, 155 S.W.2d 604 (1941).

448. Rancho Bonito Land & Livestock Co. v. North, 92 Tex. 72, 75-76, 45 S.W. 994,
996 (1898).
449. Id. at 75-76, 45 S.W. at 996; accord, Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 302-303,
294 S.W.2d 781, 788-89 (1956).
450. Coleman v. Luetcke, 164 S.W. 1117, 1118 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914,

no writ).
451. Id. at 1119.
452. Schneider v. Lipscombe County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 146 Tex., 66, 71, 202
S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (1947); Veteran's Land Bd. v. Akers, 408 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
453.

City of Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46,.202 S.W.2d 449 (1947); .Beken v.

Elstern, 503 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).

454. 146 Tex. 46, 202 S.W.2d 449 (1947).
455. Id. at 55, 202 S.W.2d at 455; see Beken v. Elstern, 503 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); cf. Eric Ericksson, Inc. v. Crooks, 508
S.W.2d 115 (Tex, Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ) (easement-found to be a breach of
warranty).
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land, and the 4 year statute of limitations begins to run. 45" Since a breach
occurs when there has been both a positive assertion of paramount title and
a yielding to that assertion, the statute will begin to run at the eviction. If
at the time of conveyance the grantee finds the premises in the possession
of one claiming under paramount title, the statute will begin to run at the
time of the conveyance. 457 In Morrison v. Howard,45 8 for example, a royalty
deed was conveyed while a third person was in possession, but the grantee
did not bring suit until 40 years after the conveyance. The court held that
the statute had begun to run at the time of the conveyance, thus barring the
suit. 45 9 If the land is unoccupied at the time of the conveyance, but a claimant with superior title subsequently takes possession, the statute will begin
to run when possession is taken. 4 60 In a case where the claimant does not
46
take possession, the statute begins to run when superior title is asserted. '
Moreover, a grantee may bring suit against any warrantor in the chain of
title, and an intermediate warrantor has 4 years from the time the action is
brought against him to bring suit against a previous warrantor. 462
DAMAGES

Under the English common law the grantee could recover on a breach of
warranty only the value of the land at the time when the warranty was
made. 465 Originally, the grantee was given an estate of equal value, but
when the purchase and sale of land became prevalent, the grant of land of
4
equal value was replaced by a refund of the consideration paid.

4

As indemnity against failure of title, the warranty entitles a grantee to dam-

ages, which are usually measured according to the consideration shown by recitals in a deed or by parol evidence. 465 If there is no evidence of considera456. Schneider v. Lipscombe County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n, 196 S.W.2d 954. 957
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 146 Tex. 66, 202 S.W.2d 832
(1947); Alvord v. Waggoner, 29 S.W. 797, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.), af'd sub nom., Eustis

v. Fosdick. 88 Tex. 615, 32 S.W. 872 (1895). See generally TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5527 (1958).
457. Eustis v. Cowherd, 23 S.W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ); cf. Fudge v.
Hogge, 323 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, no writ).
458. 261 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1953, no writ).
459. Id. at 912.
460. Jones' Heirs v. Paul's Heirs, 59 Tex. 41, 46 (1883).
461. See Eustis v. Fosdick, 88 Tex. 615, 32 S.W. 872 (1895); Wolff v. Commercial

Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
462. McPike v. Smith, 209 S.W. 815, 816 (Tex. Civ. App,-Galveston 1919, no
writ).
463. See Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84, 85 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt
adopted).
464. Id. at 85.
465. Glen v. Mathews, 44 Tex. 400, 406 (1876); Faull v. City of Dallas, 97 S.W.2d
1031, 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1936, writ dism'd).
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tion, the grantee may recover no more than nominal damages. 4 66 When consideration can be proven, the measure of damages for failure of title is limited
to the amount of the purchase money plus interest 467 since the- damages
should not exceed what the grantee has paid. 468 An interesting situation occurs when there has been an exchange of land as consideration. 469 In such
a case, the measure of damages will be the value of the property given as
consideration at the time of the conveyance. 470 Interest on the purchase
price is available to the grantee when he has not taken possession of the land,
4 71
or when the interest is more than the reasonable rental value of the land.
A breach of warranty does not require absolute failure of the entire title;
there may be a complete failure of part of the title. 4 72 Damages for a partial failure will be "the actual value of the particular lots or parcels to which
there was a failure of title, to be ascertained by their relative value compared
with the balance of the land, assuming the price agreed on . . . -473 Based
on the price paid, the damages, then, bear the same proportion to the whole
of the purchase money as the value of the part to which title fails bears to
the whole premises. 474 Thus, if land is sold by the acre, and all the acres
are of equal value, the amount of damages will be determined by first
dividing the number of acres to which title has failed by the total number
of acres conveyed, and then multiplying the resulting proportion by the total
purchase price. If the acres are of differing values, the recoverable proportion of the total purchase price will be determined by dividing the value of
the acres to which title has failed by the value of the total acres conveyed. 475
466. Glen v. Mathews, 44 Tex. 400, 406 (1876); Tarrant v. Schulz, 441 S.W.2d 868,
869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lawless v. Evans,
14 S.W. 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1889, no writ).

467. Turner v. Miller, 42 Tex. 418, 420 (1875); Tarrant v. Schulz, 441 S.W.2d 868,

870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

468. Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84, 85 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt

adopted).

469. See id. at 85.
470. Id. at 86.

471. Ledbetter v. Howard, 395 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, no
writ).
472. Felts v. Whitaker, 129 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939),
afJ'd, 137 Tex. 578, 155 S.W.2d 604 (1941).

473. Raines v. Calloway, 27 Tex. 678, 685 (1864); accord, French v. Bank of the
Southwest Nat'l Ass'n, 422 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Ragsdale v. Langford, 358 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
474. Allen v. Draper, 256 S.W. 255, 256 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, opinion
adopted); Wiggins v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84, 86 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt
adopted); French v. Bank of the Southwest Nat'l Ass'n, 422 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [ist Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
475. Wiggins

v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 84, 86

(Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt

adopted). If the deed recites the price per acre, extrinsic evidence may be introduced
to show that the acreage to which title failed is more valuable than the average price
per acre. See McBride v. Bums, 88 S.W. 394, 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, writ dism'd).
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If a grantee decides to buy the outstanding title, his damages are not
measured by the amount of consideration originally paid. Rather, he is al47 6
lowed to recover the amount paid to extinguish the outstanding claim.
4 77
These damages are considered an indemnity for the grantee's actual loss.
It is presumed that the grantee lost no more by extinguishing the outstanding
title than he would have lost through failure of his title. There could be a
difference, however, in the damages payable by the grantor if the grantee
chooses to purchase the outstanding title rather than to sue for the purchase
price. The grantor's liability thus depends on the grantee's choice of remedy
rather than on the consideration paid. This view of damages is parallel to
the measure of damages for a breach of the covenant against encumbrances,
in which the grantee's damages are determined by the value of the encumbrance at the time of the conveyance. A very different result can occur from
the purchase of an outstanding title, however, in that the value ultimately
paid for the oustanding title may be radically different from the consideration
paid at the time of conveyance. In McLendon v. Federal Mortgage Co. 478
the Waco Court of Civil Appeals assessed the value of an outstanding encumbrance to be the amount paid by the grantee to discharge it, holding that
the damages were for breach of warranty rather than breach of the covenant
against encumbrances. 47 9 This manner of measuring damages has probably
resulted from an intermingling of the concepts of warranty with those of the
covenant against encumbrances.
In a suit for damages a grantee's remedy may not be limited to the purchase price paid, because his right of action for breach of warranty is not
restricted to his immediate grantor, and he may elect to sue any one of the
warrantors in the chain of title. 480 In making such an election the warrantee
may recover from any one of the warrantors a sum not in excess of the
amount received as consideration by that warrantor. 481. Since a warrantee
can recover on the warranty of a remote grantor, 482 it would appear that even
See also Tarrant v. Schulz, 441 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (circumstances under which parol evidence is admissible).
476. Denson v. Love, 58 Tex. 468, 471-72 (1883); Johnson v. Sherrill, 271 S.W. 276,
277 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ); accord, Haynes v. Vermillion, 242

S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
477. Denson v. Love, 58 Tex. 468, 471-72 (1883); Johnson v. Sherrill, 271 S.W. 276,
277 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, no writ); accord, Haynes v. Vermillion, 242
S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

478. 60 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waoo 1933, writ ref'd).
479. Id. at 326; accord, Haynes v. Vermillion, 242 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.

-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kimmins v. McKelvey, 12 S.W.2d 1085, 1086
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, writ dism'd).
.480. Penney v. Woody, 147 S.W. 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1912, no
writ); see Eustis v. Fosdick, 88 Tex. 615, 32 S.W. 872 (1895); Hollingsworth v. Mexia,
37 S.W. 455, 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
481. Penney v. Woody, 147 S.W. 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1912, no
writ).
. 482. Lewis v. Ross, 95 Tex. 358, 363, 67 S.W. 405, 407 (1902).
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a grantee who had obtained a warranty without consideration would be able
to recover from a remote grantor, 483 and that each warrantor remains liable
on the covenant for as long as the covenant continues to run with the land.
CONCLUSION

The importance of the warranty is directly related to the fact that it is so
widely used. Warranties are used not only in conveying fee simple estates
but also in conveying other real property interests such as deeds of trust, mineral estates, mortgages, liens, leases and easements. In construing a warranty
it is necessary to determine the type of estate conveyed and whether the conveyance is valid. If there is an ineffective transfer of title, the next consideration is whether a breach has occurred. For a breach of warranty to occur
there must have been a positive assertion of superior title by a claimant and
a yielding by the grantee.
The covenant against encumbrances is also an important consideration in
analyzing a warranty, since the Texas courts have intermingled them by allowing a breach of the covenant against encumbrances to be a breach of warranty. Thus, in a warranted conveyance a suit for breach of warranty can
be maintained for a breach of the covenant against encumbrances, with damages assessed in accordance with warranty. This practice appears unnecessary because an action on breach of the covenant against encumbrances is
sufficient to protect the grantee from resulting losses. A stricter interpretation of warranty would not infringe on the protection afforded the grantee
and would allow its application to correspond to its purpose. Thus, warranty
would protect only against claims in derogation of title and would be
breached by nothing less than that type of claim.
483. See Hollingsworth v. Mexia, 37 S.W. 455, 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
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